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ReSuMO: O artigo estima o custo fiscal de um aumento da taxa básica de juros da econo-
mia considerando não apenas os efeitos diretos sobre a remuneração dos títulos indexados 
à SeLIc, mas também os efeitos indiretos que incidem sobre: (i) a remuneração dos títulos 
públicos indexados ao câmbio e à inflação; e (ii) o estoque da dívida líquida do setor pú-
blico, através do ajuste patrimonial das reservas internacionais. As projeções se baseiam 
na estimação da relação entre taxa básica de juros, taxa de câmbio e inflação a partir de 
um modelo de vetores autorregressivos. conclui-se que os efeitos indiretos têm impacto 
indeterminado sobre a taxa de juros implícita da dívida pública quando não se considera o 
ajuste no valor das reservas internacionais ocasionado pelo impacto da SeLIc na taxa de 
câmbio. A inclusão desse efeito patrimonial pode amplificar substancialmente o custo fiscal 
de uma política monetária restritiva, indicando a necessidade de uma maior articulação 
entre as políticas monetária, fiscal e cambial no Brasil.
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ABSTRAcT: The paper estimates the fiscal cost of an increase in the Brazilian policy interest 
rate – the SeLIc – by considering not only the direct effect on the yield of public bonds that 
are indexed to the SeLIc, but also indirect effects on: (i) the yield of public bonds that are 
indexed to the exchange rate and inflation, and (ii) the stock of public net debt through ad-
justments in the value of international reserves measured in domestic currency. Projections 
are based on the estimation of the relationship between interest rates, exchange rates and 
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inflation by means of a vector auto-regression. We conclude that the inclusion of such indi-
rect effects has an ambiguous effect on the response of the implicit interest rate on public net 
debt to shocks in the SeLIc, when adjustments in the value of international reserves are not 
considered. However, the inclusion of the latter amplifies the fiscal cost of a more restrictive 
monetary policy. These results call for a better coordination between monetary, fiscal and 
exchange rate policies in Brazil.
KeyWORDS: Brazilian public debt structure; monetary policy; interest rate-exchange rate 
nexus; international reserves; debt sustainability.
JeL: e43, e52, e63, H63.
INTRODucTION
When compared to the fixed exchange rate regime established in 1994, the 
adoption of inflation targeting in Brazil in 1999 brought greater flexibility to mon-
etary policy and allowed for a reduction in the level of the policy interest rate – the 
SeLIc. However, as highlighted by Barbosa-Filho (2008), the success of the new 
regime in controlling inflation has remained tied to the appreciation of the ex-
change rate, which kept basic interest rates from reaching international standards. 
As a very large portion of public bonds in Brazil are indexed to the SeLIc1, the 
maintenance of policy rates at a relatively high level has prevented a further reduc-
tion in the cost of servicing public debt, which, in turn, requires higher primary 
surpluses for achieving public debt sustainability.
For directly creating fiscal costs from a monetary policy tightening, the use of 
the SeLIc as an index for floating-rate public bonds, which initially served the 
purpose of reducing borrowing costs for the Federal government, has attracted 
great criticism in the Brazilian economic debate (Bresser-Pereira and Nakano 
(2002), Bacha (2002)). Indeed, the indexation of floating-rate public bonds to the 
policy interest rate in Brazil has added a new component to the well-known prob-
lems of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. 
In general, as discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1981), when fiscal policy in-
dependently sets its budget and demand for government bonds has an upper limit, 
the monetary authority might be forced to allow for additional inflation to prevent 
increases in the real level of public debt. However, the adoption of inflation target-
ing with floating exchange rates by (semi-) independent central Banks have posed 
additional challenges in emerging markets, as besides not preventing the risk of 
fiscal dominance, these regimes can potentially increase the degree of financial in-
stability2. For this reason, as argued by Mishkin (2000), the success of inflation 
1 In January 2014, 38% of gross debt and 74% of net debt were indexed by the SeLIc. We present a more 
complete description of Brazilian public debt composition in the subsection “Brazilian Public Debt Structure 
(page 561).
2 As pointed out by Blanchard (2004), in a period of risk aversion as faced by Brazil in 2002-03, an economy 
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targeting may still rely on a high degree of coordination between monetary, fiscal 
and exchange rate policies. The Brazilian singularity in this context is that the in-
dexation of public bonds to the SeLIc adds complexity to the puzzle. Indeed, as 
the central Bank creates a fiscal burden every time it raises the policy rate, the 
adoption of inflation targeting has often required a contractionary response of fis-
cal policy to a tightening in monetary policy as a way to avoid an increase in 
public debt and the probability of default. While such frequent combination of 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies may have generated perverse effects for 
economic growth, the creation of more fiscal space by a loose monetary policy may 
have in times turned inflation control more difficult for the central Bank. 
Taking advantage of the reduction in Brazilian public debt as a share of GDP 
in the 2000s and the period of loose monetary policy worldwide following the 2008 
crisis, the Brazilian National Treasury has started in 2010 to change its bond issu-
ance policy by lengthening the average maturity of public debt and by performing 
a gradual substitution of bonds indexed to the SeLIc rate – the so-called LFTs – by 
fixed-rate bonds (LTNs) and bonds indexed to inflation (Secretaria do Tesouro 
Nacional, 2013). While potentially reducing fiscal costs of monetary policy, as 
defended by Horta (2011), such a strategy is not consensual, as authors such as 
Nogueira (2011) see the possibility of increased systemic risk in the complete re-
placement of floating-rate by fixed-rate bonds3.
This article aims at contributing to this debate by providing a different perspec-
tive on these issues. In addition to the direct effects of the monetary shock on the 
yield of fixed-rate bonds (LFTs), the article addresses its indirect impacts, i.e., the 
impact of an interest rate shock on the yield of bonds linked to other indexes, as 
well as its effect on the value of public sector’s assets and liabilities measured in 
domestic currency. We aim thus to evaluate, in a broader perspective, the different 
links between monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies and four key macroeco-
nomic variables in Brazil: the policy interest rate (SeLIc), the inflation rate, the 
exchange rate and the level of public net debt. 
For this purpose, we first analyze the direct and indirect effects of an increase 
in the SeLIc rate on the yield of floating-rate public bonds that are indexed to the 
SeLIc itself, the exchange rate and the inflation rate. Second, we show that the 
accumulation of international reserves by monetary authorities in Brazil in recent 
years, although necessary for mitigating the impact of international financial cycles 
in the domestic economy, has turned the value in domestic currency (BRL) of the 
with a high level of foreign-currency-denominated debt is more prone to experience a real depreciation and 
further inflation following an increase in interest rates, due to a higher probability of default. 
3 “For banks, the risk is greater for investments in longer term fixed-rate financial bonds, such as LTNs 
(Brazilian Treasury Securities). If the interest rate reverses its downward trend and the new bond 
issuances of the same term start paying more, the LTNs purchased before will no longer have buyers in 
the secondary market, as they will be paying a lower interest rate than the one prevailing, at that 
moment, in the rest of the market. [...] To limit the losses to reasonable levels, the banks end up selling 
devalued securities in the secondary market” (authors’ translation from Nogueira, 2011, pp. 28-29). 
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stock of public net debt very vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. In other 
words, the value of the central Bank’s assets constituting international reserves 
increases (decreases) with the devaluation (appreciation) of the exchange rate, thus 
reducing (increasing) public net debt. 
To this end, in addition to this introduction, this article has four sections. The 
second section presents the decomposition of the Brazilian implicit interest rate on 
public debt in all its indexing factors, as a means to disentangle the evolution in 
recent years of the share of each debt component, as well as their corresponding 
yields and maturities. The third section estimates by means of a vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) the effects of variations in the policy interest rate on both inflation and 
the exchange rate, which combined serve as index to a large portion of Brazilian 
public bonds. The fourth section provides, first, the simulations of the (nominal 
and real) implicit interest rates on total net public debt following a contraction in 
monetary policy, based on both the direct and indirect effects of the SeLIc on 
other indexes and on the value of net debt. Based on such projections, the trajec-
tory of the share of public net debt in GDP is simulated for different scenarios. The 
final section concludes the paper.
DecOMPOSITION OF THe IMPLIcIT INTeReST RATe ON PuBLIc DeBT
data
Most of the data collected for this study were extracted from statistics of pub-
lic sector net debt (DSLP) and general government gross debt (DBGG) disclosed by 
the central Bank of Brazil. While public sector net debt involves the consolidation 
of liabilities and assets of all non-financial public entities(subtracting assets from 
liabilities), which includes direct administration, autonomous agencies and the 
foundations of the three spheres of Government, the central Bank and state-owned 
firms, general government gross debt includes only liabilities from the Federal 
government, states and municipalities. Data frequency is monthly and covers the 
period from December 2006 to January 2014, period for which data are available 
on the new accounting methodology for general government gross debt4.
The decomposition of public debt and interest payments has been made ac-
4 The first methodology, from 2001 to 2007, considered all bonds issued by the Treasury in the calculation, 
even those that were not put into circulation by the central Bank. The methodology introduced in 2008 
went on to consider only the bonds that were effectively backed by repurchase agreements when calculating 
the general government gross debt. This change in methodology is related to the introduction of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, which transferred from the central Bank to the Treasury the responsibility for issuing 
bonds. Another important issue concerning the data disclosed is the exclusion of Petrobras, the state-owned 
oil company, from the computation of total debt. From May 2009, Petrobras has been released from the 
primary surplus targets, and therefore its results do not integrate the tax accounts anymore. The central 
Bank of Brazil then released new data recalculating the statistics of Petrobras retroactively back to 2001. 
The data used in this paper do not include Petrobras.
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cording to six bond indexes: the policy interest rate (SeLIc), the exchange rate, the 
inflation rate based on three different price indexes (IPcA, IGP-M and IGP-DI), the 
so-called reference rate (TR), the long-term interest rate (TJLP), which applies to 
subsidized loans from the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDeS), and the 
fixed-rate fraction.
Implicit interest rate on public debt and its decomposition
The implicit interest rate on public debt rt is defined as the ratio between total 
nominal interest payments in period t, Rt, and total debt in the previous period, 
Dt-1, according to equation (1):
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We can decompose the total implicit interest rate as the sum of the product of 
the implicit interest rate corresponding to each debt component (index) i by the 
share of such component in total debt in the previous period:
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Based on this decomposition, we can analyze the effect of each component on 
the implicit interest rate as depending on both its share in total debt and on the 
trajectory of the corresponding index factor (yield).
In the case of public net debt, public sector’s liabilities are accounted with a 
positive sign in (2), while public sector’s assets come with a negative sign. Similarly, 
nominal interest flows received enter with a negative sign and nominal interest paid 
enters with a positive sign.
Brazilian public debt structure
The balance sheet of the Brazilian public sector has undergone major transfor-
mations in the last decade. On the side of public assets, the main changes refer to 
the accumulation of foreign reserves arising from the exchange rate policy adopted 
as of 2006. In addition, there was an increase in public assets indexed to the long-
term interest rate, due to the transfer of Treasury bonds to BNDeS since 2008. 
While allowing for countercyclical lending during the crisis5, this policy has relied 
on an issuance of bonds indexed to the SeLIc and to other indexes, all of which 
5 See Pereira et al. (2011) for an estimation of the counter-cyclical gains obtained from the Treasury 
injections to BNDeS during and after the 2008 crisis in terms of tax receipts, and the corresponding 
calculation of the net fiscal cost of these operations.
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require the payment by the Federal government to its bond holders of a higher 
interest rate than the one charged by BNDeS on its loans (the TJLP), thus creating 
a fiscal cost at each period of time (Gobetti, 2010).
On the liabilities side, there are two major changes: the reduction in the dollar-
denominated foreign debt, and, since 2010, the relative reduction of floating-rate 
bonds as compensated by a relative increase in fixed-rate and inflation-indexed 
bonds. As shown in Figure 1(a), the combined share of fixed-rate and inflation-in-
dexed bonds rose from 42% of gross debt in January 2010 to 54% in January 2014. 
Floating-rate bonds went to represent approximately 38% of gross debt in January 
2014, as compared to 51% in January 2010. The portion of debt indexed to the 
exchange rate has been decreasing since 2007 and represents no more than 5.4% of 
general government gross debt, reflecting the fall in external debt mentioned above.
The evolution of the composition of public sector’s net debt, presented in 
Figure 1(b), indicates an (negative) increase in the share of bonds indexed to the 
long-term interest rate (TJLP) and to the exchange rate, reflecting the accumulation 
of foreign reserves and the increase in loans from BNDeS. The TJLP almost tripled 
its participation as an index of public sector net debt between 2007 and 2014, go-
ing from -12% to -39%, as a result of the aforementioned transfers from the 
Treasury to BNDeS since the 2008 crisis. The exchange rate, in turn, indexes -49% 
of net debt in January 2014, having considerably increased its relative weight in 
recent years.
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize the gradual lengthening of federal debt 
maturities6 (Figure 2), which mainly reflects a decrease in the share of short-term 
bonds (up to 12 months) and increase in the share of long-term bonds (over 24 
months). Medium-term bonds (between 12 and 24 months) had a slight reduction 
in the share of total debt. In January 2014, the debt structure was composed by 
22% of short-term bills, 18% of medium-term bonds and 60% of long-term bonds, 
which represent a significant lengthening of maturities when compared to the com-
position of 35%, 22% and 43%, respectively, of short-, medium- and long-term 
securities in January 2007. 
The implicit interest rate and the weight of its components
The evolution of the annualized implicit interest rate on both the public sector 
net debt (DSLP) and the general government gross debt (DBGG) indicates that there 
have been fluctuations of approximately 11% per year for DBGG and 15% for 
DLSP in recent years, as shown in Figure 3. 
6 The lengthening of the average maturity of federal bonds and the maintenance of short-term maturities 
at prudent levels, as well as the continuation of the gradual replacement of bonds indexed to the SeLIc 
rate by fixed-rate and inflation-indexed bonds remained as basic guidelines in the issuance strategy for 
2013 (National Treasury, 2013).
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Figure 1: Composition of Brazilian public debt (2007-2013)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
Fixed 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Without remuneration 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Ja
n-
07
 
M
ar
-0
7 
m
ay
/0
7 
Ju
l-0
7 
se
p/
07
 
N
ov
-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
M
ar
-0
8 
m
ay
/0
8 
Ju
l-0
8 
se
p/
08
 
N
ov
-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
M
ar
-0
9 
m
ay
/0
9 
Ju
l-0
9 
se
p/
09
 
N
ov
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
M
ar
-1
0 
m
ay
/1
0 
Ju
l-1
0 
se
p/
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
M
ar
-1
1 
m
ay
/1
1 
Ju
l-1
1 
se
p/
11
 
N
ov
-1
1 
Ja
n-
12
 
M
ar
-1
2 
m
ay
/1
2 
Ju
l-1
2 
se
p/
12
 
N
ov
-1
2 
Ja
n-
13
 
M
ar
-1
3 
m
ay
/1
3 
Ju
l-1
3 
se
p/
13
 
N
ov
-1
3 
Ja
n-
14
 
Up to 12 months Between 12 and 24 months Above 24 months 
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Other 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
jan/14 
8.00% 
9.00% 
10.00% 
11.00% 
12.00% 
13.00% 
14.00% 
15.00% 
16.00% 
17.00% 
18.00% 
de
c/
07
 
fe
b/
08
 
ap
r/
08
 
Ju
n-
08
 
au
g/
08
 
oc
t/
08
 
de
c/
08
 
fe
b/
09
 
ap
r/
09
 
Ju
n-
09
 
au
g/
09
 
oc
t/
09
 
de
c/
09
 
fe
b/
10
 
ap
r/
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
au
g/
10
 
oc
t/
10
 
de
c/
10
 
fe
b/
11
 
ap
r/
11
 
Ju
n-
11
 
au
g/
11
 
oc
t/
11
 
de
c/
11
 
fe
b/
12
 
ap
r/
12
 
Ju
n-
12
 
au
g/
12
 
oc
t/
12
 
de
c/
12
 
fe
b/
13
 
ap
r/
13
 
Ju
n-
13
 
au
g/
13
 
oc
t/
13
 
de
c/
13
 
%
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
DLSP 
DBGG 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
Fixed 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Without remuneration 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Ja
n-
07
 
M
ar
-0
7 
m
ay
/0
7 
Ju
l-0
7 
se
p/
07
 
N
ov
-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
M
ar
-0
8 
m
ay
/0
8 
Ju
l-0
8 
se
p/
08
 
N
ov
-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
M
ar
-0
9 
m
ay
/0
9 
Ju
l-0
9 
se
p/
09
 
N
ov
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
M
ar
-1
0 
m
ay
/1
0 
Ju
l-1
0 
se
p/
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
M
ar
-1
1 
m
ay
/1
1 
Ju
l-1
1 
se
p/
11
 
N
ov
-1
1 
Ja
n-
12
 
M
ar
-1
2 
m
ay
/1
2 
Ju
l-1
2 
se
p/
12
 
N
ov
-1
2 
Ja
n-
13
 
M
ar
-1
3 
m
ay
/1
3 
Ju
l-1
3 
se
p/
13
 
N
ov
-1
3 
Ja
n-
14
 
Up to 12 months Between 12 and 24 months Above 24 months 
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Other 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
jan/14 
8.00% 
9.00% 
10.00% 
11.00% 
12.00% 
13.00% 
14.00% 
15.00% 
16.00% 
17.00% 
18.00% 
de
c/
07
 
fe
b/
08
 
ap
r/
08
 
Ju
n-
08
 
au
g/
08
 
oc
t/
08
 
de
c/
08
 
fe
b/
09
 
ap
r/
09
 
Ju
n-
09
 
au
g/
09
 
oc
t/
09
 
de
c/
09
 
fe
b/
10
 
ap
r/
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
au
g/
10
 
oc
t/
10
 
de
c/
10
 
fe
b/
11
 
ap
r/
11
 
Ju
n-
11
 
au
g/
11
 
oc
t/
11
 
de
c/
11
 
fe
b/
12
 
ap
r/
12
 
Ju
n-
12
 
au
g/
12
 
oc
t/
12
 
de
c/
12
 
fe
b/
13
 
ap
r/
13
 
Ju
n-
13
 
au
g/
13
 
oc
t/
13
 
de
c/
13
 
%
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
DLSP 
DBGG 
General Government Gross Debt 
Public Sector’s Net Debt 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data from the Central Bank of Brazil (2013)
Figure 2: Maturity profile of Federal Debt Securities
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The difference between the rate on gross and net debt is explained by the inter-
est rate differential between the yield of public assets and liabilities. 
Figure 3: Annualized implicit interest rate (12 months moving average)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
Fixed 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Without remuneration 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
Jan-14 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
J
a
n
-0
7
 
M
a
r-
0
7
 
m
a
y
/0
7
 
J
u
l-
0
7
 
s
e
p
/0
7
 
N
o
v
-0
7
 
J
a
n
-0
8
 
M
a
r-
0
8
 
m
a
y
/0
8
 
J
u
l-
0
8
 
s
e
p
/0
8
 
N
o
v
-0
8
 
J
a
n
-0
9
 
M
a
r-
0
9
 
m
a
y
/0
9
 
J
u
l-
0
9
 
s
e
p
/0
9
 
N
o
v
-0
9
 
J
a
n
-1
0
 
M
a
r-
1
0
 
m
a
y
/1
0
 
J
u
l-
1
0
 
s
e
p
/1
0
 
N
o
v
-1
0
 
J
a
n
-1
1
 
M
a
r-
11
 
m
a
y
/1
1
 
J
u
l-
11
 
s
e
p
/1
1
 
N
o
v
-1
1
 
J
a
n
-1
2
 
M
a
r-
1
2
 
m
a
y
/1
2
 
J
u
l-
1
2
 
s
e
p
/1
2
 
N
o
v
-1
2
 
J
a
n
-1
3
 
M
a
r-
1
3
 
m
a
y
/1
3
 
J
u
l-
1
3
 
s
e
p
/1
3
 
N
o
v
-1
3
 
J
a
n
-1
4
 
Up to 12 months Between 12 and 24 months Above 24 months 
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Exchange rate 
Price index 
Selic 
TR 
TJLP 
Fixed 
Other 
Jan-07 
Jan-08 
Jan-09 
Jan-10 
Jan-11 
Jan-12 
Jan-13 
jan/14 
8.00% 
9.00% 
10.00% 
11.00% 
12.00% 
13.00% 
14.00% 
15.00% 
16.00% 
17.00% 
18.00% 
d
e
c
/0
7
 
fe
b
/0
8
 
a
p
r/
0
8
 
J
u
n
-0
8
 
a
u
g
/0
8
 
o
c
t/
0
8
 
d
e
c
/0
8
 
fe
b
/0
9
 
a
p
r/
0
9
 
J
u
n
-0
9
 
a
u
g
/0
9
 
o
c
t/
0
9
 
d
e
c
/0
9
 
fe
b
/1
0
 
a
p
r/
1
0
 
J
u
n
-1
0
 
a
u
g
/1
0
 
o
c
t/
1
0
 
d
e
c
/1
0
 
fe
b
/1
1
 
a
p
r/
11
 
J
u
n
-1
1
 
a
u
g
/1
1
 
o
c
t/
11
 
d
e
c
/1
1
 
fe
b
/1
2
 
a
p
r/
1
2
 
J
u
n
-1
2
 
a
u
g
/1
2
 
o
c
t/
1
2
 
d
e
c
/1
2
 
fe
b
/1
3
 
a
p
r/
1
3
 
J
u
n
-1
3
 
a
u
g
/1
3
 
o
c
t/
1
3
 
d
e
c
/1
3
 
%
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
DLSP 
DBGG 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data from the Central Bank of Brazil (2013). 
Note: % per year; DLSP; DBGG; Dec; May; Oct; Mar; Aug; Jan; Jun; Nov; Apr; Sep; Feb; Jul; Dec.
Figure 4 shows the relative contribution of each type of bond in total net interest 
payments and, therefore, the implicit interest rate. This contribution is given by the 
share in the payment or receipt of interest flows on net debt (DLSP), as presented in 
the subsection “Data” on page 560. The figure shows that floating-rate bonds (in-
dexed to the SeLIc rate) exert a greater impact on the implicit interest rate on net 
debt (reaching 50% in January 2012), which is mainly due to its larger share in total 
debt. However, cuts in the policy rate during 2012 and the relative reduction in the 
share of SeLIc indexed-bonds have led to a decrease in the corresponding implicit 
interest rate, thus causing a reduction in their contribution to the total implicit inter-
est rate. Inflation-indexed bonds and fixed-rate bonds saw their contributions to the 
implicit interest rate increase in recent years, mainly due to the new issuance policy.
The portion linked to the long-term interest rate (TJLP), which did not vary 
greatly throughout this period, had a negative contribution on the implicit interest 
rate. As mentioned above, the TJLP only indexes public assets, namely all loans 
from the development bank to business companies. However, this type of operation 
is usually associated with increased public liabilities that serve as counterpart for 
the Treasury bond transfers, resulting in a higher implicit interest rate on total 
public net debt. 
The implicit interest rate corresponding to the exchange rate-indexed portion 
of debt is influenced both by the receipt of interest flows related to foreign ex-
change reserves and the payment of interest regarding the portion of exchange-rate 
indexed bonds, which is small but still significant (approximately 5% of the gen-
eral government gross debt in 2013). As shown in Figure 4, this index has little 
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impact on the total implicit interest rate when only flows of interest payments and 
receipts are considered. However, the exchange rate affects not only these flows, 
but also the value of the accumulated stocks of liabilities and (essentially) public 
assets in domestic currency, which could change the value of the implicit interest 
rate on public net debt corresponding to all types of bonds.7 This element is not 
captured in Figure 4, but will be explored in the simulations on the fourth section.
Figure 4: Relative contribution of each index to  
the implicit interest rate on net public debt
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Source: Authors’ elaboration using data from the Central Bank of Brazil (2013).
ecONOMeTRIc eSTIMATION
The aim of this section is to estimate, through a vector autoregression, the ef-
fects of a monetary tightening, triggered by a shock of 0.5 percentage points8 in the 
SeLIc rate, on the inflation rate measured by the consumer price index (IPcA) and 
on the exchange rate. These two variables influence the evolution of the implicit 
7 Although the calculation of the implicit interest rate does not explicitly consider a revaluation of assets 
and liabilities in each period due to exchange rate fluctuations, for the simulation below, we use an 
expanded concept of implicit interest rate, considering that, in addition to effects on the flows of 
payments, there is an effect on the stock of debt and the corresponding rates.
8 From 2003 to 2013, 0.5 was the mode change in the policy interest rate in Brazil. From the 71 changes 
in the policy rate promoted by the central bank along this period, 36 were ±0.5 percentage points.
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interest rate and the public sector net debt, since both function as indexes to public 
debt and are key determinants of its dynamics. The results presented herein will be 
used in the fourth section for the simulation of the trajectory of the implicit interest 
rate and public net debt following a shock in monetary policy.
data
The sample adopted comprises monthly data from January 2003 to December 
2013, with a total of 132 observations. The endogenous variables used to capture 
the indirect effects of the variations in the SeLIc rate in the future trajectory of the 
two other main indexes of public bonds in Brazil (exchange rate and inflation rate) 
are: the annualized monthly average SeLIc rate as provided by the central Bank 
of Brazil; the seasonally adjusted monthly industrial physical production, con-
structed by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGe); the month-
ly average real-dollar exchange rate measured by the central Bank of Brazil; and, 
finally, the monthly IPcA inflation rate, provided by IBGe, which we seasonally 
adjusted9 through u.S. Bureau census X12 methodology. As exogenous variables, 
all obtained through Bloomberg, we used the cDS-Brazil as a proxy for sovereign 
risk; the overnight rate of the Federal Reserve of the uSA (Fed Funds); and the 
Standard & Poors GScI (SPGScI) commodity price index.
responses of inflation and exchange rates to shocks in the interest rate
In order to allow for the interpretation of our estimation results as elasticities 
of response to shocks in the interest rate, all variables have been transformed into 
logarithms for the econometric study10.
To check for the presence of unit roots, we performed augmented Dickey–
Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Phillips and Perron (PP) (Phillips and 
Perron, 1988) tests11, including only intercept, and intercept plus trend. The same 
tests were carried out for all series in first differences so as to verify the order of 
integration of the series that have a unit root.
For the exchange rate, the SeLIc policy rate, the industrial production index, 
commodity prices (SPGScI) and the Fed Funds rate (FF), all tests for the series in 
level did not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root with 5% confidence, which 
have allowed us to treat the series as non-stationary. All tests for the inflation rate 
(IPcA) and cDS rejected the null hypothesis of unit root, also with 5% confidence.
As there is no evidence of the presence of a unit root for all series, cointegration 
9 For seasonal adjustment, we use IPcA monthly inflation data since January 1998. 
10 As the series for the inflation rate contains negative observations, a linear transformation was 
performed by adding 0.6 p.p. to the entire IPcA series before taking logarithms. This procedure does 
not change the coefficients for models in first differences Luporini (2008), which is the case of this study. 
11 Test results are available upon request.
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tests were not performed, as they require that all variables are integrated of the 
same order. Alternatively, we have studied the joint behavior of these variables in 
a vector autoregression model using variables in first differences12.
The endogenous vector yt consists of the first difference of the variables SELIC, 
IPCA, ER, and IP, all in logarithms, where IPCA stands for the inflation rate, ER 
is the Brazilian Real (BRL) – uS dollar (uSD) exchange rate, and IP is the indus-
trial production index, with the latter used as a proxy for economic activity. The 
choice of variables was very similar to that of Luporini (2008). 
In order to control for some of the external effects on the Brazilian economy, 
we added a few exogenous variables. The literature has found that commodity 
prices, as measured by the SPGScI index, influence the determination of the ex-
change rate, the inflation rate and industrial production. The Fed Funds rate, in 
turn, was used as a proxy for the level of the foreign interest rate, and can influence 
all endogenous variables of the system, as well as the Brazilian Sovereign risk, as 
represented by the 5-year cDS (cDS5y).
The selection of the lag structure was performed considering the baseline rec-
ommendations of Schwarz (VAR (1)) and Akaike (VAR (10)) information criteria, 
as well as the LR (VAR (8)) sequential likelihood ratio. To select the order of the 
VAR model, we considered the trade-off between parsimony and robustness, as-
sessed in terms of residual behavior. Models including one to five lags have shown 
serial correlation. The estimation of a VAR(6) has shown no heteroskedasticity and 
no serial autocorrelation based on an LM test. Finally, as in other studies focusing 
on the transmission channels of monetary policy such as Minella (2003) and 
Luporini (2008), residuals have not been found to be normal.
As widely known in the literature, a crucial part of estimating impulse-response 
function is the identification of the reduced-form VAR to get the structural equations. 
After selecting the order of the vector autoregression with all variables in first dif-
ferences, we have generated cumulative impulse response functions for a cholesky 
one standard deviation shock in the SeLIc policy rate. The ordering adopted is 
similar to the ones verified in christiano et al. (1999), Minella (2003), Dedola and 
Lippi (2005) and Tomazzia and Meurer (2009): industrial production, inflation rate, 
SeLIc and exchange rate. The rationale for the ordering is that the proxy for the 
output (industrial production) does not contemporaneously respond to the other 
variables (and rather affects them) because the level of production is decided before 
the production takes place; the price level (or in our model the inflation rate) may 
be affected contemporaneously by current demand and production, while under 
normal circumstances the exchange rate and the SeLIc only affect it after a time 
12 Despite being stationary, the inflation rate was also included in first differences in the VAR, as 
estimations in levels do not show a significant impact of the policy interest rate on inflation. In other 
words, changes in the policy rate seem to accelerate (or decelerate) the inflation rate in Brazil, rather 
than creating (or eliminating) inflation itself. This result may be related to the importance of structural/
inertial components in Brazilian inflation, which are due to strong price indexation mechanisms (for a 
seminal discussion of this Brazilian singularity see Arida and Resende (1985).
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lapse; the SeLIc rate for instance is decided on a regular basis and the central bank 
has good indicators for assessing the current level of production and prices and then 
set the base interest rate; and finally the exchange rate is a high-frequency data that 
is potentially affected contemporaneously by all the information set.
Figure 5: Accumulated Responses to a shock  
of one Cholesky standard deviation ± 2 S.D.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
After a certain time lapse, an increase in the policy rate is expected to generate 
an appreciation of the exchange rate, a reduction in industrial activity (and eco-
nomic activity) and a reduction in inflation. Figure 5presents the impulse response 
functions to a one cholesky standard deviation in d ln (SELIC), all of which show 
the expected signs13, namely a negative overall response of industrial production, 
the exchange rate and the inflation rate over a two-year period. The appreciation 
of the exchange rate is instantaneous and persists over time. The inflation rate 
measured by the IPcA index reaches its lowest value after 8-10 months, and re-
mains at a lower level. 
13 The responses to the shock in the SeLIc are not statistically different from zero. For this reason these 
results should be cautiously interpreted. Still, our simulation exercise is carried out.
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Table 1: Variation of the inflation rate and the exchange 
 rate following a shock in the policy rate
Period
Shock of one Cholesky S.D. Shock of 0.5 p.p.
SELIC ER IPCA SELIC ER IPCA
0 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
1 1,5% -0,1% 0,0% 4,8% -0,5% 0,0%
2 2,5% -0,3% -1,0% 8,0% -0,9% -3,3%
3 3,2% -0,5% -0,1% 10,3% -1,5% -0,2%
4 4,1% -0,8% -1,0% 13,1% -2,5% -3,1%
5 4,4% -0,7% 0,5% 14,4% -2,2% 1,8%
6 4,7% -0,6% -0,9% 15,3% -1,9% -3,0%
7 5,1% -0,8% -1,8% 16,5% -2,6% -5,7%
8 5,3% -0,9% -2,7% 17,3% -3,0% -8,4%
9 5,5% -1,0% -2,5% 17,9% -3,3% -7,9%
10 5,7% -1,3% -3,1% 18,7% -4,0% -9,7%
11 5,8% -1,3% -3,0% 18,9% -4,1% -9,3%
12 5,7% -1,2% -2,9% 18,7% -4,0% -9,1%
13 5,6% -1,3% -2,7% 18,5% -4,1% -8,6%
14 5,5% -1,3% -2,9% 18,0% -4,1% -9,2%
15 5,4% -1,3% -2,8% 17,7% -4,1% -8,9%
16 5,4% -1,3% -3,3% 17,6% -4,2% -10,4%
17 5,3% -1,3% -3,2% 17,4% -4,2% -10,1%
18 5,3% -1,3% -3,1% 17,4% -4,2% -9,8%
19 5,3% -1,3% -3,0% 17,3% -4,3% -9,5%
20 5,3% -1,3% -2,9% 17,2% -4,2% -9,2%
21 5,2% -1,3% -2,9% 17,1% -4,2% -9,0%
22 5,2% -1,3% -3,0% 17,0% -4,2% -9,5%
23 5,2% -1,3% -2,9% 17,0% -4,1% -9,1%
24 5,2% -1,3% -3,0% 17,0% -4,2% -9,3%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Note: the initial values considered for the monthly IPCA and real-dollar exchange rate were 0.48% (average 
monthly inflation in 2013) and R$ 2.34 per dollar (average in December, 2013), respectively.
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Based on the impulse response functions to a standard deviation shock in d ln 
(SELIC), we have obtained, for a given initial value, the responses to a shock of 0.5 
percentage points in the SeLIc by transforming results accordingly. In other words, 
for each level of the SeLIc rate there is a certain shock in first differences that cor-
responds to a change of 0.5 percentage points in the actual rate. Starting from a 
SeLIc rate of 10%, which prevailed by the end of December 2013, the magnitude 
of the shock in first differences that is equivalent to a 0.5 percentage points increase 
in the SeLIc rate is 0.04879.
This transformation has allowed us to evaluate the indirect effects of an in-
crease of 0.5 in the SeLIc rate on the yield of other public bonds and the trajec-
tory of public net debt. In particular, in order to simulate the trajectory of the infla-
tion rate and the exchange rate following the shock, we have calculated the change 
in their levels over 24 months and applied these changes to their initial values.
Table 1 shows the magnitudes used for projecting the indirect effects of a shock 
in the policy rate on the IPcA inflation rate and the BRL-uSD exchange rate, as 
well as on the SeLIc rate itself. In other words, results have shown that an initial 
increase in the SeLIc rate is followed by a cycle of monetary tightening. Hence, the 
effects we study can be understood as triggered by an initial shock in the SeLIc 
rate, but encompass a whole cycle of monetary tightening. All accumulated chang-
es were applied to the initial values prevailing in the month of the shock. After 24 
months, according to the estimates carried out, our estimates indicate that the 
monetary tightening triggered by a 0.5 p.p. shock in the policy rate results in a 
reduction of 9.3% on the inflation rate and a 4.2% appreciation of the Brazilian 
Real against the dollar.
SIMuLATIONS
Simulation of the implicit interest rate on public net debt
The projection of the implicit interest rate on public net debt following a shock 
in the policy interest rate has proven to be a complex task. The complication 
arises from the existence of a wide variety of public bonds in the market, when we 
consider not only their nature (fixed-rate, floating-rate, etc.), but also the different 
maturities. 
even the direct effect of increasing the SeLIc rate on the floating-rate portion 
of public debt is difficult to assess, since the interest payments on these bonds occur 
only at the time of their maturity. In practice, as an ex-post variable, the interest 
rate effectively paid by the government is not automatically affected by the increase 
in the SeLIc. This increase is gradually incorporated as the floating-rate bonds 
liquidation occurs. In addition, this impact is more diluted, the greater the matu-
rity of the bonds, since it is only by the liquidation of the floating-rate bonds, the 
holder receives the interest rate accumulated over the period. 
Given the technical difficulties related to the calculation of yields and maturities, 
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our study has established a few simplifying hypotheses associated with the impact 
of the interest rate shock on the yield of public bonds, and thus on the correspond-
ing implicit interest rates. The main hypotheses are that: (i) the implicit interest rate 
of the floating-rate portion immediately absorbs the shock; (ii) the implicit interest 
rate corresponding to the inflation-indexed fraction suffers the indirect impact of 
the higher SeLIc on the inflation rate immediately, and (iii) the fixed-rate portion 
does not suffer the effect of the interest rate shock. In general, these hypotheses 
overestimate the effect of the variation in the different indexes on the corresponding 
implicit interest rates, which yields an ambiguous net effect on the total rate. On the 
one hand, the positive effect of the interest rate shock on the implicit interest rate 
corresponding to the floating-rate fraction of debt is overstated. On the other hand, 
the negative effect on the implicit interest rate corresponding to the inflation-indexed 
portion is also overestimated, as highlighted in Table 2. 
Table 2: Yield of public assets and liabilities and hypotheses of the simulations
Indexes(bonds) As it occurs in practice Hypothesis adopted
SELIC
(LFT)
There is no interest coupon pay-
ment and at maturity the main va-
lue updated by the SELIC rate 
is paid. 
The interest payment rate is affected 
by 0.5 p.p. one month after the sho-
ck. The initial value is the average im-
plicit interest rate over the previous 
12 months.
Inflation
(NTN-B)
At maturity, the main value updated 
by the accumulated IPCA is paid 
and there is a semi-annual interest 
coupon payment1. 
The yield of the bond is affected 
indirectly by the shock, according to 
its effect on monthly inflation2. The 
initial value is the average implicit 
interest rate over the previous 12 
months.
Fixed-rate
(LTN and NTN-F)
The fixed interest rate is determi-
ned at the time of the sale of the 
bond, with discount, on the primary 
market, but is only paid at the matu-
rity of the bond3. 
The fixed interest payment is kept 
constant and reproduces the avera-
ge implicit interest rate over the 12 
months prior to the shock. 
Exchange
These bonds may have different for-
mats; the most common one pays 
interest coupon and the main one 
is updated by the variation of the 
exchange rate. 
The yield of the bond is affected indi-
rectly by the shock, according to its 
effect on the monthly exchange rate.
TJLP
The TJLP indexes BNDES loans, and 
can be changed if the SELIC rate 
changes substantially.
The implicit interest rate is kept 
constant, reproducing the average of 
the 12 months prior to the shock.
TR
(CFT, NTN, CDP)
The TR pays different bonds that are 
not offered at auction. The SELIC 
has an indirect impact on TR4.
The implicit interest rate is kept 
constant, reproducing the average of 
the 12 months prior to the shock.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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This simplification does not affect the main conclusions of the study, namely 
that a restrictive monetary policy still has significant fiscal costs, due to two impor-
tant effects: the indirect effects of the shock in the policy rate on other public bond 
indexes (exchange rate and inflation), and the impact of monetary policy on the 
value of public sector’s assets in domestic currency (through an increased cost of 
carrying foreign reserves). 
Figure 614 shows the simulation results for the implicit interest rate on net 
public debt after an increase of 0.5 percentage points in the SeLIc rate, assuming 
the simplifying hypotheses presented in Table 2. The initial increase in the policy 
rate endogenously generates further increases in the SeLIc afterwards, so that the 
shock can be interpreted as the beginning of a monetary tightening cycle: as can be 
seen in Table 1, the policy rate achieves a peak after 11 months, being 18,8% 
higher than before the shock. 
The impact is measured in three different ways, all of which assumed away any 
changes in the composition of debt. For this end, we took as reference the debt 
structure prevailing in December 2013 and the average implicit interest rate of each 
debt component over the 12 months prior to the month of reference.
Figure 6: Evolution of the nominal implicit interest rate on public  
net debt after a shock of 0.5 p.p. in the policy rate
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The first simulation only measures the direct effect of the interest rate shock, 
namely, the impact of the increase in the SeLIc rate on the floating-rate fraction 
14 The first observation plotted in Figure 7 is equivalent to 2013 average nominal implicit interest rate. 
Following figures (2-25) stands for the predicted values. The same logic is applied in Figures 8, 9, and 10.
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of the stock of bonds. We can note a permanent increase in the implicit interest rate 
as, ceteris paribus, the floating fraction incorporates the interest rate increase. 
The second simulation incorporates the indirect effects of the policy shock, 
which essentially focus on the yield of the inflation-indexed bonds. The inclusion 
of the indirect effect reduces the nominal implicit interest rate in comparison with 
the first simulation. This reduction can be explained by the impact of the increase 
in the interest rate on the inflation rate, which reduces the payment of interest on 
inflation-indexed bonds.
Figure 7: Evolution of the real implicit interest rate on public  
net debt after a shock of 0.5 p.p. in the policy rate
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Finally, the third simulation measures the total effect of the monetary tighten-
ing cycle by also incorporating the adjustment in the value of public sector’s assets 
in domestic currency, as caused by the appreciation of the exchange rate. The ap-
preciation of the exchange rate has the effect of increasing public net debt, as it 
devalues the stock of foreign reserves in national currency. This effect on the value 
of net debt does not change the net amount of interest paid, which is the numerator 
in the calculation of the implicit interest rate, but, by increasing the denominator, 
it relatively reduces the implicit interest rate. Hence, with the inclusion of the 
variation in asset values, our results reinforce the ambiguous nature of the impact 
of a monetary policy shock on the nominal implicit interest rate on net public debt 
in the short-run, as this effect goes in the opposite direction of the increase in inter-
est paid on the floating-rate portion15.
15 The reason these effects cannot be applied to the long-run is that the renewal of the stocks of other 
bonds would eventually be affected by an increase in the basic interest rate, in particular fixed-rate 
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Moreover, the idea that the indirect effect on inflation positively contributes 
to the government fiscal stance (as it relatively reduces nominal implicit rates) is 
also misleading, as highlighted by the trajectory of the real implicit interest rate 
shown in Figure 7. With the inclusion of the indirect effect, which reduces the rate 
of inflation, the same nominal interest payment results in a greater real implicit 
interest rate. In other words, the effect of the reduction in inflation, on the one hand, 
reduces the nominal payment of interest of the inflation-indexed bonds (as com-
pared to the case in which only direct effects takes place), and on the other hand, 
increases the real implicit interest rate. For this reason, the two simulated real im-
plicit interest rates considering indirect effects (with or without variation in asset 
values) are greater than the real implicit interest rate that considers only the direct 
effect of the policy shock. As will be seen in the following subsection, the real im-
plicit interest rate is the one relevant for the evolution of public debt.
The trajectory of net public debt
Given the trajectory for the implicit interest rate on net public debt presented 
in the previous subsection, it is possible to assess the evolution of the stock of net 
public debt from the law of motion represented in equation (3). 
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where D stands for the stock of net debt, Y is GDP, r is the real implicit inter-
est rate (subtracting the inflation rate from the nominal implicit interest rate), s is 
the primary surplus and V is the change in the value of net debt arising from asset 
revaluations.
Besides starting from the law of motion in (3), projections have maintained all 
the previous assumptions regarding the composition of public debt and the behav-
ior of implicit interest rates corresponding to each bond index i. Simulations based 
on (3) required additional assumptions for the annual GDP growth rate (2.3%) 
and the primary surplus as a percentage of GDP (2.0%)16.
We present the projections for net debt as a share of GDP following a 0.5 p. p. 
shock in the policy rate as deviations from the scenario we call ‘unchanged mon-
etary policy’. Of course, the values for the baseline scenario follow the same law 
of motion represented in (3). In other words, we keep the same assumptions for 
GDP growth and the primary surplus, but we also keep the implicit interest rates 
constant through time.
bonds. The pricing of such bonds, as that of any financial asset, depends on the capitalization of an 
expected income flow based on a reference discount rate. Hence, given the increase in the SeLIc, we 
can expect that newly issued fixed-rate bonds will offer a higher yield.
16 These values project 2013 actuals as a baseline. 
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Figure 8 shows the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio for each of the previous 
scenarios – including only the direct effect on floating-rate bonds, also including 
indirect effects on exchange rate and inflation-indexed bonds, and incorporating 
asset revaluation effects – in the aftermath of the monetary tightening. 
The figure highlights both a significant increase in public net debt to GDP and 
the substantial difference in the evolution of net debt when the revaluation of pub-
lic net assets is considered. In 24 months, the monetary tightening triggered by the 
0.5 p.p. shock in SeLIc rate causes a 1.6 p.p. increase in public sector net debt as 
a share of GDP, more than the 0.6 p.p. observed in the case when only the impact 
on floating-rate bonds is considered. This difference can be explained once again 
by the currency appreciation caused by the shock.
When it comes to the inclusion of indirect effects, the reduction in the inflation 
rate and the corresponding increase in the real implicit interest rate leads to a rela-
tive increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio when compared to the first scenario.
Figure 8: Evolution of the public debt-to-GDP ratio as deviation of ‘unchanged monetary policy’ 
case following a shock of 0.5 p.p. in the policy rate (in p.p.)
Source: Author’s elaboration.
evolution of net public debt based on different scenarios for GDP growth and 
the primary surplus
The projections in Figure 9 show the evolution of the net debt-to-GDP ratio 
following an increase of 0.5 p.p on the SeLIc rate considering different sce-
narios for GDP growth and the primary surplus of the government, as presented 
in Table 3.
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Table 3: Scenarios for projection of the debt-to-GDP ratio
Scenarios Δ GDP (%)
Primary surplus 
(%GDP)
Base 2.3 2.0
Scenario 1 (recession) 0 2.0
Scenario 2 (growth) 4.5 2.0
Scenario 3 (fiscal expansion and growth) 5 1.5
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Scenario 1 is one of economic stagnation, which could be a result of the inter-
est rate shock itself, and shows a considerable increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Two years after the shock, the share of net debt in GDP is 5.6 p.p. higher than its 
initial value (33.4%). 
Figure 9: Evolution of the public debt-to-GDP ratio as deviation of ‘unchanged monetary policy’ 
case following a shock of 0.5 p.p. in the policy rate for different scenarios
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Scenario 2 maintains the same primary surplus but considers an optimistic 
scenario for economic growth (4%). The combination of this scenario with the 
interest rate shock keeps net debt stable, thus offsetting the impact of the monetary 
tightening. In other words, given the base scenario (in which GDP growth is 2.3%), 
an increase of 2.2 p.p. in the annual GDP growth rate is needed to partially offset 
the monetary tightening if the government wants to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio 
stable.
Finally, Scenario 3 shows that, when considering the combination of the inter-
est rate shock and a relatively expansionary fiscal policy, as reflected in a reduction 
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of the primary surplus from 2.0% to 1.5% of GDP, there is need for an even 
higher rate of economic growth in order to keep debt sustainability.
cONcLuSION
The debate on the fiscal costs of monetary policy in Brazil has traditionally 
attributed to the role of floating-rate bonds the main responsibility for burdening 
the government fiscal stance whenever the central Bank raised the policy rate. The 
present article has sought to deepen this discussion by incorporating the analysis 
of indirect effects of variations in the policy interest rate on other public bond in-
dexes, namely the exchange rate and the inflation rate, as well as the impact of this 
effect on the valuation of foreign reserves in domestic currency.
When it comes to nominal interest flows, the inclusion of such indirect effects 
seems to mitigate fiscal costs of monetary policy when compared to the case where 
only the impact on floating-rate bonds that are indexed to the policy interest rate 
are considered. This difference arises especially through the impact on inflation, 
which relatively reduces nominal interest payments on the fraction of inflation-
indexed bonds. However, when it comes to the stock of net debt, an increase in the 
debt burden is caused by the negative effect of the currency appreciation on the 
value of public sector’s foreign assets measured in domestic currency.
Given the simplifying hypotheses of the model, our simulations show that, 
after two years, a monetary policy tightening triggered by a positive shock of 0.5 
percentage points in the policy rate causes an increase of 1.6 p.p. on public net debt 
as a ratio to GDP. Further, the projected response of the debt-to-GDP ratio to the 
monetary tightening based on different scenarios for GDP growth and the primary 
surplus reinforce these conclusions, as even in the most optimistic scenario, GDP 
growth does not fully compensate the perverse effects of monetary tightening on 
the level of debt.
It is important to point out that we have only considered scenarios based on 
a constant structure of public debt. In recent years, the composition of Brazilian 
public debt has changed significantly towards a de-indexation of bonds from the 
policy interest rate and a higher issuance of fixed-rate and inflation-indexed bonds. 
Our results suggest that in the short term, without considering variations in asset 
values, the recent increase in price indexation is indeed mitigating the direct impact 
of monetary policy on the implicit interest rate on public debt. The same applies to 
the increase in the fixed-rate fraction of total debt, even if that will take more time 
to play a role, as fixed-rate bond payments are mostly realized in the medium or 
long run. However, by also taking into account revaluations in foreign reserves, one 
can argue that the recent changes in the issuance policy of the Brazilian National 
Treasury are not substantially diminishing the fiscal costs that arise from a mone-
tary contraction.
In short, our results indicate that the existence of a significant stock of foreign 
reserves have strengthened the fiscal costs of a monetary policy tightening via the 
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exchange rate channel, even if these costs have also been reduced by recent chang-
es in the bond issuance policy. Rather than calling for a slower accumulation of 
foreign reserves, which remains important for mitigating the country’s vulnerabil-
ity to international liquidity cycles, the evidence presented in this study adds an-
other piece to the well-known trade-offs involved in the adoption of inflation tar-
geting when there is need for policy coordination. 
While on the one hand, adding a permanent concern over public debt sustain-
ability to the execution of monetary policy does not seem compatible with its 
mandate keeping inflation on target; on the other hand, requiring the primary 
surplus to instantaneously vary in response to changes in the policy interest rate 
(and the exchange rate) as a way to stabilize the level of public net debt may add 
pro-cyclical features to the implementation of fiscal policy, with potentially perverse 
effects for economic growth and/or inflation control. Hence, the complex set of 
interactions between policy tools and goals examined in this paper seem to call for 
an intermediate configuration, with some degree of coordination between fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies over longer periods of time.
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